PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS. CLEAR BOUNDARIES.
Chat & Communities
How private messages, devices, calls, communities, Passport and official support work across web and native Chat.
- Reviewed
- Approved month
- February 2026
- Effective
- 2026-11-16
- Status
- effective
4th Floor 20 Fenchurch Street London EC3M 3BY United Kingdom
Country of establishment: United Kingdom
support@pullup.atAT A GLANCE
- Private DMs use device encryption; community channels and support cases use a different model.
- Device keys and recovery material determine which history you can read.
- Routing, membership, reports and call metadata still exist.
A reading guide. Read the full clauses for their conditions and scope.
On this page
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1. Account, products and audience
One account does not mean one visibility model.
Chat uses your Pullup identity, account session and permission-controlled backend. Official web/native releases may offer different functions. Sign-in, device authorisation and community membership are separate checks.
The Privacy Policy covers lawful grounds, recipients, international processing, retention and rights. The Terms and Acceptable Use Policy apply to messages, calls, media and communities. This notice explains the specific boundaries; it does not promise an unreleased app or change a transaction.
2. Private messages and device envelopes
The server delivers encrypted payloads, not ordinary DM plaintext.
Private message content is encrypted for registered recipient devices using X25519 sealed-box encryption. Device secret keys are held in the browser/transport key store; the backend stores encrypted envelopes and delivery records. Content protection does not make the account, counterparties, timestamps or device registrations invisible.
Participants can read content on authorised devices and can copy, screenshot, photograph or disclose it. A compromised endpoint, unlocked device or malicious recipient can defeat practical confidentiality. A participant can choose to share relevant evidence in a report or support case.
Do not assume a private DM's encryption applies to community posts, public artwork, support evidence, hosted email or a separately connected application. Check the destination before sending.
3. Device keys, backup and history transfer
A new login is not a universal history-recovery key.
Keys can be held in IndexedDB in the Chat web or native transport context. Optional key backup uses password-derived protection and encrypted backup material. Device approval, key restoration and approved history transfer are different operations.
A newly registered device may only decrypt messages addressed to its keys unless usable backup/history transfer restores the required material. Losing every relevant key or recovery secret can make history unreadable. Pullup cannot promise to reconstruct missing plaintext from encrypted envelopes.
Protect backup passwords and approve only devices you recognise. Removing a device limits future authorised access as implemented; it cannot erase plaintext, keys or copies it already obtained. Clearing browser/app storage may remove usable local keys as well as preferences.
4. Metadata and controls
Encryption does not remove delivery and access records.
Backend records can include participant/conversation IDs, device public keys and registration, envelope/message IDs, timestamps, delivery state, requests, blocks and the enabled read-receipt/typing settings. These operate messaging, synchronisation, safety and access controls.
Local clear, deletion for yourself, deletion for everyone and conversation expiry have different effects. Configured expiry can remove server records on its cleanup schedule; it does not remotely remove another person's screenshots, saved media, exports or independently retained evidence.
Blocking/request controls apply within their stated scope. They do not guarantee that someone cannot find a public profile, view public content, use an external channel or contact through a different permitted context.
5. Photos and voice messages
Private media protection differs from public community assets.
Private photos and recorded voice messages use encrypted uploads with expiry/access controls. Delivery still creates storage, timing, type/size and related technical metadata. Voice recording uses the microphone when you choose that feature; it is not a promise that all ambient sound is excluded.
Recipients decrypt supported private media on their devices and can retain copies. Cleanup does not guarantee deletion of all client/provider backups at the same instant. File selection and preview can also create device/browser copies.
Community artwork uses a different storage path and can have publicly accessible URLs. An invitation-only community does not by itself make the underlying artwork URL confidential. Do not upload identity, medical or confidential evidence as artwork.
6. Audio/video calls and connectivity
Calls need device permission and a workable network.
Calls use WebRTC encrypted transport and the implemented key/fingerprint verification flow. Camera/microphone access depends on the action, app and OS permission. The other participant can independently record or disclose a call; comply with applicable recording/privacy rules.
STUN, signalling and configured TURN relays help establish calls. Cloudflare STUN and, where configured, TURN services can receive network/connection information. Direct peer connections can reveal a participant's public network address to the other peer; relay use has its own provider metadata.
Native calling can use CallKit, PushKit and Apple push services for incoming-call routing. Device tokens, call IDs, timing and delivery records can be processed. Calls are not emergency services, guaranteed alerts, guaranteed availability or a permanently stored recording.
7. Communities, channels and moderation
Channel posts are server-readable.
Communities store ordinary server-processed messages, membership, roles, channel permissions, reactions, invitations and moderation records. They are not end-to-end encrypted private DMs. Authorised operators, moderators and platform staff can access relevant records within their duties.
Public and private access settings affect who can enter/read; participants may copy what they see. Do not post secrets in public channels or assume an invitation prevents every onward disclosure.
Community operators must use member information lawfully, publish appropriate rules and avoid unrelated exports/profiling. Reports may lead to necessary investigation or restrictions with the applicable notice/review rights.
8. Official support and evidence
A private case is accessible to authorised support staff.
Official support combines public community channels with separate private cases. Private case content/evidence is available to the case owner and authorised staff under the case workflow; internal notes have separate staff visibility. This is not the private-DM encryption model.
Cases may contain selected order/account context, replies, attachments, staff actions, timestamps and audit/history notifications. Share only relevant evidence. Do not include passwords, recovery secrets, full card numbers or unrelated identity/medical records.
Report sensitive issues through a private case or support@pullup.at. A public post is not automatically converted to a confidential case. Published official support links help establish the intended destination but do not make unsolicited messages from an impersonator safe.
9. Passport, profiles, coins and notifications
Privacy settings have a defined audience.
Profile, account-age/status, stamps, shared cities, gifts and cosmetics can be visible according to the feature and settings. Disabling map sharing suppresses the implemented location fields for other viewers; your own account may still display its records. Account-age displays are not proof of age-of-majority verification.
Gifts/coins and store purchases can create entitlement and financial records. A visual badge is not cash or a guaranteed redemption right. Check the actual offer, currency and billing channel.
Private-message push uses generic encrypted-message alerts rather than sending ordinary DM plaintext in that push payload. Other notification types can carry relevant routing, mention, gift, community or support information. OS previews and device access can still expose notifications.
10. Your choices and help
Use account controls and protect local copies.
Review devices, backups, receipt/typing preferences, requests/blocks, community permissions, map sharing and notifications where available. Sign-out, key removal, account closure and subscription cancellation are distinct.
The native Chat app can use a persistent WebKit crypto transport behind native screens; encryption keys and local storage are not therefore all stored exclusively in native Keychain. Calling credentials can use Keychain and decoded content can exist in device memory.
The general rights/contact process applies. Pullup can provide available records but cannot export plaintext it cannot decrypt. Rights concerning another participant or community are balanced with their rights and lawful retention.